Friday, December 07, 2012

Is the Arminian God ominbenevolent?

The Society of Evangelical Arminians, that beacon of moral and theological discernment, is plugging a post by Randal Rauser:



Arminians like to point out that according to Calvinism God elects some people to damnation.

Calvinists like to point that out too. Reprobation isn’t something we’re ashamed of.


 Of course some Calvinists try to soften this teaching by claiming that the election to damnation is a passive divine act according to which God simply “passes over” and thereby opts not to redeem these people.

Unfortunately this shift in nomenclature doesn’t really make the divine act of election to damnation passive in an ethically significant way. Indeed, it calls to mind James Rachels’ famous thought experiment on passive euthanasia so I’m going to borrow from that thought experiment to make my point.

Imagine that Bob decides that old Mr. Jones should die. There are two ways Bob could bring about Mr. Jones’ death.

    Scenario 1: Bob drowns Mr. Jones in the bathtub.

    Scenario 2: Bob witnesses Mr. Jones slip in the bathtub and stands by passively as Mr. Jones drowns.

Scenario 1 may result in Bob’s legal culpability in a way that scenario 2 does not (though for regions with a Good Samaritan law Bob may bear some legal culpability in scenario 2 as well). But few will dispute that Bob’s moral culpability in Mr. Jones’ drowning is equivalent in scenarios 1 and 2.

When the Calvinist avers that God passes over the reprobate, thereby refusing to impute to them the righteousness of Christ which will result in their salvation, the divine withholding parallels Bob’s withholding of life-saving aid to Mr. Jones. Just as God withholds divine aid to result in reprobation so Bob withholds human aid to result in death.

But the thought-experiment disregards the fact that Jones is wicked. Even at a merely human level, there are situations in which we have no duty to save someone’s life. Suppose the man who slips in the bathtub is a Mafia Don or malevolent dictator. Suppose he’s an “abortion provider.” Am I under some obligation to save his life? By saving his life, I will indirectly take the lives of innocent people whom he will subsequently murder.

I didn’t create the life-threatening situation. But given the situation, that might be a godsend.


At this point the Calvinist might raise the following tu quoque objection. “Arminianism faces a similar problem,” he says. How so? “On the Arminian view God foreknows who will freely reject him and yet he still elects to create those people knowing that they will be reprobated. That isn’t any different.”

The objection reveals an important confusion. Let’s say that there are ten people. 1-5 are elect and 6-10 are reprobate. On the Calvinist view God could have elected all to salvation but opted not to. In other words, on the Calvinist view there is a possible world in which 1-10 are elect. But God opted not to create that world.

Things are very different on the Arminian view. On this view there may be no possible world in which 1-10 are elect because there is no possible world in which 1-10 repent. That’s an important difference.

But still, the Calvinist does have a point, doesn’t he? Why didn’t God just create a world with 1-5 so that everybody would be elect? The problem with that suggestion is this: there is no reason to think that 1-5 would all be elect in a world where only 1-5 exist.

Let’s say, for example, that in the actual world Smith is reprobate and Smith Jr. is elect. Could God create a world in which Smith doesn’t exist but Smith Jr. does? Let’s assume that he can. Still, does it follow that in that alternate world (or, more specifically, in that subset of worlds in which Smith doesn’t exist but Smith Jr. does) that Smith Jr. is elect? This doesn’t follow. It may indeed be the case that in every possible world in which 1-5 exist but 6-10 do not that not all of 1-5 are elect.

In conclusion, the Calvinistic view deals a heavy blow to any doctrine of omnibenevolence and consequently faces a unique problem not faced by the Arminian.

i) First of all, Rauser hasn’t given us any tangible reason to think that out of all the gazillions of possible worlds, there’s not a single world in which everyone freely believes in God. Why should we think that’s a plausible scenario?

ii) And if it only “may” be the case that there is no such world, then it “may” equally be the case that there is one or more such worlds. So why does Rauser lay so much weight on a guess?

iii) In any event, Rauser’s comparison fails on its own terms. For he framed the comparison in terms of divine “omnibenevolence.” But if the Arminian God knowingly creates a world in which some people will be damned, then he’s not being benevolent to them.

However, let’s go back to the original post, which includes some of Rauser’s comments:


Before God creates he surveys the range of possible worlds which have people who freely repent and he opts to create one of those worlds which achieves as optimal a balance of saved over loss as is possible.

But in that case, the Arminian God is not omnibenevolent. For he’s not benevolent to the lost. He’s not acting in their best interests. To the contrary, he’s harming them. He has sacrificed their welfare for the benefit of the saved. On that view, God is utilitarian rather than omnibenevolent.


This is simply a description of transworld depravity…

What positive evidence is there to think transworld depravity is real?


I don't think that God could have achieved the goods he wants to achieve without the evil of hell (i.e. some creatures in rebellion against him). If he could have achieved that good without hell he surely would have.

But in that case, God’s goals conflict with omnibenevolence, and his goals take precedence over omnibenevolence. The Arminian God achieves the goods he wants to achieve at the expense of the damned. His goals override their wellbeing. He squashes anyone who gets in the way of his goals. His goods aren’t good for them. His goods are bad for them.


I'm an annihilationist. That means I believe in a general resurrection to a judgment that culminates in the complete destruction of the unregenerate individual (i.e. "capital punishment).

How is annihilationism omnibenevolent? Rauser may think it’s nicer than everlasting punishment, but that doesn’t make it omnibenevolent in its own right.

If God is omnibenevolent, why does he need to punish anyone? Why would an omnibenevolent God punish unbelievers for being unbelievers? Why destroy them just because they reject him? How is that benevolent? Why not let them continue to exist on their own in some part of the universe?

If God is omnibenevolent, wouldn’t remedial punishment be the only type of punishment he metes out? Punishment intended to help rather than harm?

So what’s the point of annihilationism? It’s not remedial punishment. Seems purely vindictive from the standpoint of someone who espouses omnibenevolence.

35 comments:

  1. Is the Arminian God ominbenevolent?

    No.

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  2. Hi Steve, thanks for your comments.

    “But the thought-experiment disregards the fact that Jones is wicked.”

    Yes, it also disregards the fact that Jones is wicked because Bob determined that he’d be wicked by Bob’s determining decree. (eyeroll)

    “But in that case, the Arminian God is not omnibenevolent.”

    Incorrect. If there is no world of libertarianly free creatures in which all creatures choose God then he can choose to create one of the worlds in which not all those creatures choose him.

    And this pushes us back to the question of why I should think transworld depravity exists. The answer? Because I believe God loves all rather than arbitrarily selecting to love (and so elect) some and hate (and so reprobate) others. Given that I believe this transworld depravity is an excellent explanation for why not all are saved.

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    1. RD Rauser

      “Yes, it also disregards the fact that Jones is wicked because Bob determined that he’d be wicked by Bob’s determining decree. (eyeroll)”

      An eye roll is not an argument, Randal. If you’re going to raise that objection, you need to explain why that’s a problem. Just describing the Reformed position doesn’t amount to a rational objection.

      “Incorrect. If there is no world of libertarianly free creatures in which all creatures choose God then he can choose to create one of the worlds in which not all those creatures choose him.”

      Which fails to show how God is omnibenevolent in that situation. God is still not benevolent to *everyone*. He’s not benevolent to those who lose out in your utilitarian cost/benefit analysis.

      “And this pushes us back to the question of why I should think transworld depravity exists. The answer? Because I believe God loves all rather than arbitrarily selecting to love (and so elect) some and hate (and so reprobate) others. Given that I believe this transworld depravity is an excellent explanation for why not all are saved.”

      i) Why do you believe that God everyone? What’s your evidence for that claim? It can’t be Scripture, since you routinely reject Biblical passages which run counter to omnibenevolence.

      And it can’t be experience, for the disparate distribution of weal and woe in our world doesn’t suggest that God loves everyone.

      ii) Election and reprobation aren’t “arbitrary.”

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    2. "An eye roll is not an argument, Randal. If you’re going to raise that objection, you need to explain why that’s a problem. Just describing the Reformed position doesn’t amount to a rational objection."

      The eye roll wasn't intended as an argument. Rather, it was pointing out two things (my eye rolls are pretty cool in that they can make multiple points): first, every analogy breaks down at some point. What is important is that the analogy is sustained at the relevant point; two, if you do attempt to extend the analogy by including wickedness then I can extend it further by including the divine decree.

      As for the arbitrariness claim, I've argued that at length in my blog. There is no cause internal to the agent that leads God to choose one agent rather than another.

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    3. RD Rauser

      “The eye roll wasn't intended as an argument. Rather, it was pointing out two things (my eye rolls are pretty cool in that they can make multiple points): first, every analogy breaks down at some point. What is important is that the analogy is sustained at the relevant point.”

      By disregarding the moral character of the reprobate, your analogy breaks down at a critical juncture.

      “Two, if you do attempt to extend the analogy by including wickedness then I can extend it further by including the divine decree.”

      But you need to do more than that. Merely describing the Reformed position doesn’t refute it. You need to demonstrate how your extension is damaging to the Reformed position. You can’t just assert that it’s damaging.

      “As for the arbitrariness claim, I've argued that at length in my blog.”

      I’ve argued the contrary at length on my blog.

      “There is no cause internal to the agent that leads God to choose one agent rather than another.”

      There doesn’t have to be. If someone who’s elect in this world is reprobate in a possible world, or if someone who’s reprobate in this world is elect in a possible world, then that individual difference will, in turn, lead to alternate world histories. Alternate world histories with different evils and compensatory goods.

      Since alternate histories reflect significant differences, it’s not arbitrary for God to prefer one over another. You’re artificially isolating elect and reprobate individuals from the world history their respective paths generate. The Calvinist God can have reason to prefer one world history over another. It’s not like Buridan’s Ass, where there’s no relevant difference between two equally succulent bales of hay.

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    4. Steve,

      "There doesn’t have to be. If someone who’s elect in this world is reprobate in a possible world, or if someone who’s reprobate in this world is elect in a possible world, then that individual difference will, in turn, lead to alternate world histories. Alternate world histories with different evils and compensatory goods.

      Since alternate histories reflect significant differences, it’s not arbitrary for God to prefer one over another. You’re artificially isolating elect and reprobate individuals from the world history their respective paths generate. The Calvinist God can have reason to prefer one world history over another. It’s not like Buridan’s Ass, where there’s no relevant difference between two equally succulent bales of hay."

      Interesting response. But it does seem like you are changing the subject from "why is Bob elect in this world?" to "why did God create this world?" The first choice could be arbitrary even if the second is not. For example, I could arbitrarily choose a nail out of a can when building a dog house, as opposed to building a fence.

      Put another way, if we assume no LFW, then God shapes every detail in each possible world. So it seems like election is arbitrary in each possible world; even if the selection of some possible world over others is not.

      God be with you,
      Dan

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    5. Godismyjudge

      "But it does seem like you are changing the subject from 'why is Bob elect in this world?' to 'why did God create this world?'" The first choice could be arbitrary even if the second is not.

      Those are intertwined considerations. You can't compartmentalize a possible world from the possible persons and personal histories which comprise it.

      "Put another way, if we assume no LFW, then God shapes every detail in each possible world. So it seems like election is arbitrary in each possible world; even if the selection of some possible world over others is not."

      How is that more "arbitrary" than any variants in a possible world? Different possible worlds collectively ring the changes on all logical permutations. Each possible world must be selective.

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  3. Randall,

    Why would God annihilate those who don't freely choose Him? Why not allow them to continue on living on a tropical paradise away from heaven?

    How is God destroying those who don't want Him loving towards them in your system? Is non-existence better than our current existence? Surely for God to allow them to continue existing as they do now. Nay, he could even improve their situation by giving them any of their fleshly desires in their private paradise.

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    1. Hi JeremiahZ,

      Scripture teaches clearly that God's kingdom will progress to the point where God will be all in all and his kingdom will be on earth as it is in heaven. If somebody refuses to submit to God ultimately then God will deal with that. The difference between the Arminian and Calvinist on this point is simply that for the Calvinist God is the primary cause of that person refusing to submit. Now that's a head scratcher.

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    2. i) But, Randal, by your own admission, you often reject what Scripture clearly teaches.

      ii) Anyway, quoting Scripture doesn't harmonize annihilationism with omnibenevolence. The thesis of omnibenevolence has its own inner logic. You have to show how annihilationism is consistent with the logic of omnibenevolence. How is that the most benevolent way to treat unbelievers?

      iii) Punting to Calvinism doesn't relieve the problems with your own position.

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    3. I've never said I reject "what scripture clearly teaches". Quite the contrary. Could it be Steve, that not everybody agrees with your assessment of what scripture clearly teaches?

      It is benevolent to grant creatures free will if free will is indeed of great value, and then to do all you can to ensure that the maximum number of those creatures possible achieve shalom in a way consistent with that free will.

      I'll respond to your other comment later today. Got some errands to do...

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    4. Rauser said: "The difference between the Arminian and Calvinist on this point is simply that for the Calvinist God is the primary cause of that person refusing to submit." Yet Rauser's God is the one who chose to instantiate the world in which the person who refuses to submit was created, and thus is the primary cause of that person refusing to submit. The person who was created didn't decide which world would exist. God did.

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    5. Peter,

      God is the preserving or sustaining cause on an Arminian view but he is not the concurring cause that serves as the primary willing agent for secondary willings of the human agent.

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    6. "Peter,

      God is the preserving or sustaining cause on an Arminian view but he is not the concurring cause that serves as the primary willing agent for secondary willings of the human agent."


      Peter, you patzer. God is not the primary willing agent for your blunders in chess.

      Get it? Got it? Good!

      ;-)

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    7. Rauser said: "God is the preserving or sustaining cause on an Arminian view but he is not the concurring cause that serves as the primary willing agent for secondary willings of the human agent." I didn't know we could just argue by adjective. Makes things easier.

      7-year-old Rauser: [munching cookies] These are good cookies.
      Rauser's Mom: Are you eating the cookies? I told you not to eat any cookies!
      7yoR: These aren't "any" cookies. These are "specific" cookies.
      RM: [trying to take cookies] I told you you can't have any of those cookies!
      7yoR: These aren't "those" cookies. These are "these" cookies.

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  4. RD Rauser

    “I've never said I reject ‘what scripture clearly teaches’. Quite the contrary. Could it be Steve, that not everybody agrees with your assessment of what scripture clearly teaches?”

    By your own frequent admission, Scripture attributes certain commands and actions to God (e.g. killing everyone [except for Noah’s family] in the flood, killing everyone in Sodom and Gomorrah [except for Lot’s family], commanding the mass execution of the Canaanites inside the promised land, commanding Abraham to sacrifice Isaac). You deny the truth of these ascriptions. You deny that God said or did what Scripture specifically and explicitly imputes to him in these cases. You’ve done this repeatedly on your blog. So this is *your* interpretation, not mine.

    “It is benevolent to grant creatures free will if free will is indeed of great value, and then to do all you can to ensure that the maximum number of those creatures possible achieve shalom in a way consistent with that free will.”

    Ensuring that the maximum number will achieve shalom at the corollary cost of ensuring that many others will be destroyed. That’s not omnibenevolent. That’s not acting in the best interests of each and every individual. Rather, that’s selective benevolence. God is benevolent to some free creatures and malevolent towards other free creatures. Some are sacrificed for the sake of others.

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    1. Read the Westminster Confession Steve. It describes God as being without passions (meaning God is not acted upon) despite the fact that God declares in Hosea 11 "My heart is changed within me; all my compassion is aroused."

      It desctibes God as (atemporally) eternal despite the fact that God is freely described in the Bible as one to whom temporal predicates apply.

      It describes God as being metaphysically simple despite the fact that God is described in the Bible in metaphysically complex terms (e.g. as exemplifying various attributes and being three persons).

      Did the Westminster Divines reject the Bible? According to your reasoning apparently so.

      Way to go Steve!

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    2. i) I take that to be your weaselly, back door admission that my allegation about your view of Scripture was correct. Thanks for the confirmation.

      ii) Since I’m not a Westminster Divine, I really can’t speak for them. But as a general matter, theologians in the classical theistic tradition have a doctrine of analogy, according to which Scripture sometimes refers to God analogically rather than univocally. So, for instance, when Scripture imputes body parts to God, that’s analogical. We begin by asking how a body part functions. At that level of abstraction, we then consider how that’s analogous to something about God.

      iii) However, that’s not a promising strategy to salvage your own position. You’d have to claim that God did something analogous to killing the prediluvians and the Sodomites, something analogous to commanding Abraham to sacrifice Isaac or commanding the Israelites to execute Canaanites in the Promised Land. What would the intended analogy be?

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    3. Steve, the doctrine of analogy is not the issue here. What is relevant is that the Westminster Divines denied the literal reading of straightforward declarations of God's passions, temporal action and metaphysical complexity. And they did so under the influence (so to speak) of traditional Aristotelian philosophical categories.

      Like the Westminster Divines, my reading of certain passages of scripture is informed by philosophical reflection and moral intuition. And the fact that you think this is observation is "weaselly" suggests you might do well to read some books on Protestant scholasticism.

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    4. RD Rauser

      “Steve, the doctrine of analogy is not the issue here. What is relevant is that the Westminster Divines denied the literal reading of straightforward declarations of God's passions, temporal action and metaphysical complexity. And they did so under the influence (so to speak) of traditional Aristotelian philosophical categories.”

      Several problems with your response:

      i) Yes, the doctrine of analogy is pertinent. You said the WCF “describes God as being without passions (meaning God is not acted upon) despite the fact that God declares in Hosea 11 ‘My heart is changed within me; all my compassion is aroused.’”

      However, the Westminster Divines wouldn’t say Hosea’s statement was false. Rather, they’d say that statement was analogically true. They’d affirm it at the relevant level of abstraction.

      ii) Let’s contrast this with your own view of Scripture:

      “So what do you do when it appears that a portion of the text is errant morally or historically, or otherwise?…That is the kind of attitude I commend toward scripture. There could be errors of grammar (indeed there are), as well as history, science and even morality. In the same way that we could in principle allow such errors in a masterfully composed classic text like Ulysses, so it would seem we could in principle allow such errors in scripture, so long as there is some reason that the author allowed those errors to enter into the final form of the text. Consequently, the reader’s task is not to edit the book into the form he likes, or to ignore the parts she doesn’t like, but rather to work on those errant bits which seem recalcitrant to the reader’s understanding of the logic of the whole.”

      http://randalrauser.com/2011/04/inerrancy-how-to-save-a-lost-concept-by-comparing-the-bible-to-ulysses/

      “I don't actually reject inerrancy. I sign a document every year in the ETS that affirms my assent to the doctrine. But the thing about inerrancy is that it is a doctrine very much in need of an interpretation. A person can say that God superintended a process which led to the inclusion of any number of human errors in the text but that God did so with perfect (i.e. inerrant) intentions. By analogy: an author might include all sorts of factual errors in his novel as uttered by the characters within the novel. Though the statements of the characters are in error, the author inerrantly included them in the novel. So all the criticisms I've raised are consistent with a broad confession of inerrancy.”

      http://randalrauser.com/2011/04/affirming-implying-and-inerrancy/#comment-577988609

      You’re position isn’t at all comparable to the Westminster Divines.

      iii) You also erect a false dichotomy between literal meaning and analogical meaning, as if what’s analogical is figurative. But that’s clearly misguided. Although every metaphor is an analogy, every analogy is not a metaphor. Analogies can be literally true. The distinction is not between literal and nonliteral, but the relevant level of abstraction at which the comparison literally holds. What’s the general property which the referent and its analogue share in common?

      “Like the Westminster Divines, my reading of certain passages of scripture is informed by philosophical reflection and moral intuition. And the fact that you think this is observation is ‘weaselly’ suggests you might do well to read some books on Protestant scholasticism.”

      i) That’s just a ruse. One of your polemical tactics is to impute to your opponent positions or statements they didn’t make, then fault them for affirming or denying something they never spoke to one way or the other.

      ii) This is just a table-turning maneuver on your part to deflect attention away from your own position.

      iii) Moreover, interpreting Hosea’s statement analogically doesn’t require the imposition of philosophical presuppositions. The book itself clearly uses adultery as an allegory for Israel’s spiritual infidelity. Therefore, a “straightforward” reading of the text would take that into account from the get-go.

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    5. Hi Steve,

      The primary issue in Hosea 11 is not analogy. Rather, it's accommodation. The Westminster Divines would reconcile divine impassibility with Hosea's description of God as highly passible by appealing to divine accommodation.

      That's fine. They can do that. But you should recognize that when they do that they are rejecting the straightforward reading of the text based on philosophical (Aristotelian) principles.

      The "table turning" as you put it is simply a matter of me illustrating how naive you are about the way philosophical presuppositions inform the hermeneutics of your own Reformed tradition.

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    6. RD Rauser

      “The primary issue in Hosea 11 is not analogy.”

      The fact that you say so doesn’t make it so.

      “Rather, it's accommodation. The Westminster Divines would reconcile divine impassibility with Hosea's description of God as highly passible by appealing to divine accommodation.”

      i) It isn’t necessary to invoke divine accommodation to understand this passage anthropomorphically. A doctrine of analogy will do just fine, especially considering the way Hosea allegorizes God’s relation to Israel by depicting God as a jilted husband.

      ii) But as far as that goes, both divine impassibility and divine accommodation can be justified on Scriptural grounds.

      “That's fine. They can do that. But you should recognize that when they do that they are rejecting the straightforward reading of the text based on philosophical (Aristotelian) principles.”

      What you’re pleased to call the “straightforward reading” is, in fact, a reading that cuts against the grain of the text. A truly straightforward reading would take into account the allegorical context of the statement, where God is to a cuckold husband as Israel is to a faithless wife. You are ripping the passage out of context. You’re disregarding the allegorical framework. So the passage was meant to be construed analogically rather than univocally.

      Original intent favors an anthropomorphic interpretation. God is depicted anthropomorphically in that passage because that’s part of the extended theological metaphor which Hosea is using to illustrate God’s relation to apostate Israel.

      “The ‘table turning’ as you put it is simply a matter of me illustrating how naive you are about the way philosophical presuppositions inform the hermeneutics of your own Reformed tradition.”

      i) Unless you really are that obtuse, you have a habit of deliberately misrepresenting what your opponents said because that tactic is polemically useful to you.

      I did not affirm or deny that philosophically presuppositions might inform how Westminster Divines interpret the passage in Hosea. I haven’t directly interacted with your claim because it’s just a decoy on your part to divert attention away from your derogation of Scripture.

      ii) You continue to use this appeal to dodge your own position. But as I pointed out before, your position isn’t comparable to the Westminster Divines. You impute error to the word of God–they did not. They didn’t use philosophical presuppositions to correct the Bible. You do.

      iii) Even if they were wrong to filter a passage like Hosea through classical Christian theism, to say their interpretive grid was mistaken is completely different from saying the Bible itself was mistaken when it ascribes certain commands and actions to God.

      iv) BTW, it’s not as if elements of classical Christian theism can’t be justified from Scripture.

      Scripture itself distinguishes God from man (e.g. Num 23:19; 15:29). Therefore, it’s not unscriptural or extrascriptural to construe some Biblical representations anthropomorphically.

      Likewise, there are Scriptural passages which indicate that history unfolds according to God’s antemundane master plan for the world. In that case it’s not unscriptural or extrascriptural to posit a fundamental asymmetry between divine and human agency, where God acts on man, but not vice versa. In a similar vein is the potter/clay metaphor.

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    7. RD Rauser

      "Read the Westminster Confession Steve...you should recognize that when they do that they are rejecting the straightforward reading of the text based on philosophical (Aristotelian) principles. The 'table turning' as you put it is simply a matter of me illustrating how naive you are about the way philosophical presuppositions inform the hermeneutics of your own Reformed tradition."

      How Aristotelian is the Westminster Confessional doctrine of God?

      1. There is but one only, living, and true God, who is infinite in being and perfection, a most pure spirit, invisible, without body, parts, or passions; immutable, immense, eternal, incomprehensible, almighty, most wise, most holy, most free, most absolute; working all things according to the counsel of his own immutable and most righteous will, for his own glory; most loving, gracious, merciful, long-suffering, abundant in goodness and truth, forgiving iniquity, transgression, and sin; the rewarder of them that diligently seek him; and withal, most just, and terrible in his judgments, hating all sin, and who will by no means clear the guilty.

      2. God hath all life, glory, goodness, blessedness, in and of himself; and is alone in and unto himself all-sufficient, not standing in need of any creatures which he hath made, nor deriving any glory from them, but only manifesting his own glory in, by, unto, and upon them. He is the alone fountain of all being, of whom, through whom, and to whom are all things; and hath most sovereign dominion over them, to do by them, for them, or upon them whatsoever himself pleaseth. In his sight all things are open and manifest, his knowledge is infinite, infallible, and independent upon the creature, so as nothing is to him contingent, or uncertain. He is most holy in all his counsels, in all his works, and in all his commands. To him is due from angels and men, and every other creature, whatsoever worship, service, or obedience he is pleased to require of them.

      3. In the unity of the Godhead there be three persons, of one substance, power, and eternity: God the Father, God the Son, and God the Holy Ghost: the Father is of none, neither begotten, nor proceeding; the Son is eternally begotten of the Father; the Holy Ghost eternally proceeding from the Father and the Son.

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    8. Cont. 1. God, from all eternity, did, by the most wise and holy counsel of his own will, freely, and unchangeably ordain whatsoever comes to pass: yet so, as thereby neither is God the author of sin, nor is violence offered to the will of the creatures; nor is the liberty or contingency of second causes taken away, but rather established.

      2. Although God knows whatsoever may or can come to pass upon all supposed conditions, yet hath he not decreed anything because he foresaw it as future, or as that which would come to pass upon such conditions.

      3. By the decree of God, for the manifestation of his glory, some men and angels are predestinated unto everlasting life; and others foreordained to everlasting death.

      4. These angels and men, thus predestinated, and foreordained, are particularly and unchangeably designed, and their number so certain and definite, that it cannot be either increased or diminished.

      5. Those of mankind that are predestinated unto life, God, before the foundation of the world was laid, according to his eternal and immutable purpose, and the secret counsel and good pleasure of his will, hath chosen, in Christ, unto everlasting glory, out of his mere free grace and love, without any foresight of faith, or good works, or perseverance in either of them, or any other thing in the creature, as conditions, or causes moving him thereunto; and all to the praise of his glorious grace.

      6. As God hath appointed the elect unto glory, so hath he, by the eternal and most free purpose of his will, foreordained all the means thereunto. Wherefore, they who are elected, being fallen in Adam, are redeemed by Christ, are effectually called unto faith in Christ by his Spirit working in due season, are justified, adopted, sanctified, and kept by his power, through faith, unto salvation. Neither are any other redeemed by Christ, effectually called, justified, adopted, sanctified, and saved, but the elect only.

      7. The rest of mankind God was pleased, according to the unsearchable counsel of his own will, whereby he extendeth or withholdeth mercy, as he pleaseth, for the glory of his sovereign power over his creatures, to pass by; and to ordain them to dishonor and wrath for their sin, to the praise of his glorious justice.

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    9. Cont. 1. It pleased God the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, for the manifestation of the glory of his eternal power, wisdom, and goodness, in the beginning, to create, or make of nothing, the world, and all things therein whether visible or invisible, in the space of six days; and all very good.

      2. After God had made all other creatures, he created man, male and female, with reasonable and immortal souls, endued with knowledge, righteousness, and true holiness, after his own image; having the law of God written in their hearts, and power to fulfill it: and yet under a possibility of transgressing, being left to the liberty of their own will, which was subject unto change. Beside this law written in their hearts, they received a command, not to eat of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil; which while they kept, they were happy in their communion with God, and had dominion over the creatures.

      1. God the great Creator of all things doth uphold, direct, dispose, and govern all creatures, actions, and things, from the greatest even to the least, by his most wise and holy providence, according to his infallible foreknowledge, and the free and immutable counsel of his own will, to the praise of the glory of his wisdom, power, justice, goodness, and mercy.

      2. Although, in relation to the foreknowledge and decree of God, the first Cause, all things come to pass immutably, and infallibly; yet, by the same providence, he ordereth them to fall out, according to the nature of second causes, either necessarily, freely, or contingently.

      3. God, in his ordinary providence, maketh use of means, yet is free to work without, above, and against them, at his pleasure.

      4. The almighty power, unsearchable wisdom, and infinite goodness of God so far manifest themselves in his providence, that it extendeth itself even to the first fall, and all other sins of angels and men; and that not by a bare permission, but such as hath joined with it a most wise and powerful bounding, and otherwise ordering, and governing of them, in a manifold dispensation, to his own holy ends; yet so, as the sinfulness thereof proceedeth only from the creature, and not from God, who, being most holy and righteous, neither is nor can be the author or approver of sin.

      5. The most wise, righteous, and gracious God doth oftentimes leave, for a season, his own children to manifold temptations, and the corruption of their own hearts, to chastise them for their former sins, or to discover unto them the hidden strength of corruption and deceitfulness of their hearts, that they may be humbled; and, to raise them to a more close and constant dependence for their support upon himself, and to make them more watchful against all future occasions of sin, and for sundry other just and holy ends.

      6. As for those wicked and ungodly men whom God, as a righteous Judge, for former sins, doth blind and harden, from them he not only withholdeth his grace whereby they might have been enlightened in their understandings, and wrought upon in their hearts; but sometimes also withdraweth the gifts which they had, and exposeth them to such objects as their corruption makes occasions of sin; and, withal, gives them over to their own lusts, the temptations of the world, and the power of Satan, whereby it comes to pass that they harden themselves, even under those means which God useth for the softening of others.

      7. As the providence of God doth, in general, reach to all creatures; so, after a most special manner, it taketh care of his church, and disposeth all things to the good thereof.

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  5. I wonder if Rauser is a fanboy of Roger Olson. Didn't Olson say something like if it turns out that Calvinism is a more accurate description of God than Arminianism, then Olson would't want to worship such a God?

    Rauser seems rather similar to Olson in that regard.

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    1. Why don't you just ask Rauser? No wait, let me do it.

      "Hey Rauser?"

      "What?"

      "Truth Unites wants to know if you'd worship God if Calvinism is true."

      "Sure. Would Truth Unites worship God if Arminianism is true?"

      Huh. Good question. Well Truth Unites? Would you?

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    2. It's good to hear that Randal Rauser would worship a Calvinist God.

      God is God. I worship God whatever and however He decrees.

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    3. How can Rauser worship a God he deems to be evil?

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    4. Truth, is that your indirect way of saying that you'll worship God even if it means shining Roger Olson's shoes because he was right all along?! :)

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    5. RD Rauser: "Why don't you just ask Rauser? No wait, let me do it.

      "Hey Rauser?"

      "What?"

      "Truth Unites wants to know if you'd worship God if Calvinism is true."

      "Sure."


      Steve: "How can Rauser worship a God he deems to be evil?"

      Randal Rauser, do you deem a Calvinist God as evil?

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    6. There's no such thing as "a Calvinist God" or "an Arminian God". There is just the Christian God.

      I think that Calvinism makes certain claims about the Christian God which are false and are, among other things, inconsistent with his metaphysical perfection. I reject those claims.

      You think that Arminianism makes certain claims about the Christian God which are false and are, among other thigs, inconsistent with his metaphysical perfection. You reject those claims.

      But will you shine Dr. Olson's shoes if you're wrong? (I'll gladly shine John Piper's shoes if I'm wrong.)

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    7. Rauser: "There's no such thing as "a Calvinist God" or "an Arminian God". There is just the Christian God."

      -----

      Roger Olson: "The God of Calvinism scares me; I'm not sure how to distinguish him from the devil."

      Steve Hays' Rebuttal: "Well, his reasoning is reversible. If Arminian theism is wrong, then, by his own logic, Arminianism is synonymous with Satanism. If Arminian theism is wrong, then, by his own logic, Olson is a devil-worshipper."

      From The Hands-Off Theodicy

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    8. RD Rauser

      “There's no such thing as ‘a Calvinist God’ or ‘an Arminian God’. There is just the Christian God.”

      Either you’re dissembling or you really are that dense. I use these adjectival labels to distinguish differing concepts of God. I do that for ease of reference. Are you unable to absorb that elementary distinction?

      Professing Christians representing different theological traditions often have differing concepts of God, viz. the Arminian concept, Calvinist concept, Thomist concept, neotheist concept, process concept.

      In addition, there’s the Muslim concept, Hindu concepts, &c.

      Yes, we can say “there is just the Christian God,” but that leaves unexplained just what the Christian God is actually like. Which concept of God truly corresponds to God? Which concept is right or approximately right? Which concept is closer to the truth, or coincident with the truth?

      “I think that Calvinism makes certain claims about the Christian God which are false and are, among other things, inconsistent with his metaphysical perfection. I reject those claims.”

      In which case you don’t regard the Calvinist God as worshipful even if that turned out to be the correct description of God.

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  6. "Steve, the doctrine of analogy is not the issue here. What is relevant is that the Westminster Divines denied the literal reading of straightforward declarations of God's passions, temporal action and metaphysical complexity."

    But what they didn't do is deny those passages were *true*, that they spoke truly about God, even if in an analogous or accomodative way.

    "Like the Westminster Divines, my reading of certain passages of scripture is informed by philosophical reflection and moral intuition. And the fact that you think this is observation is "weaselly" suggests you might do well to read some books on Protestant scholasticism."

    I'm not entirely sure what you mean here, but what you seem to do isn't what I took away from my reading of Muller, Van Asselt, et al. re: the Reformed Scholastics.

    Regarding Olson and Arminianism and sin and the convo with Peter Pike, I note in Arminian Theology Myths and Realities, Olson wrote: “God is the first cause of whatever happens; even a sinful act cannot occur without God as its first cause…” (p. 122) when representing Arminius' position.

    We should also note that Arminians admit God could stop sin, but instead "permits" it for a greater good. Olson admits God “cooperates” with sinners in doing sinful actions. He says God “permits” the evils to happen. If Olson did this, he would be immoral. Indeed, Olson seems to sense this problem and so claims that God can do these things “without being stained by the guilt of sin” (p. 122).

    Moreover, libertarians like Joshua Rasmussen have argued that the probability is very high, exceedingly high, that God could create a sinless world.

    Oh, and then there's that little problem with whether libertarian free will is even intelligible, and if it is, whether it's actual in our world. Given the recent claims by a majority of neuroscientists, as well as neurophilosophers, it's not clear that even if lFW is logically possible that it's actual. It is rather funny to watch libertarians act like "science denying" 6 day fundies. Libertarianism is on the ropes, it shouldn't be given a free pass in these convos.

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